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Environmental & Energy, Industrial Organization
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Climate Policy, Industry Concentration and Technology Adoption: Taxes, Subsidies and Rebates
Decarbonising heavy industry is a key challenge for climate policy. To reduce emissions, the European Union explicitly identifies the adoption of green technologies that lower emission intensity as a major avenue. This paper investigates which policies can incentivise an efficient decarbonisation of the heavy industry sector. I develop a dynamic model of imperfect competition and endogenous production technology upgrading, using recent developments in the modelling of dynamic continuous investment choices. A carbon tax alone leads to inefficient outcomes and a suboptimally low uptake of green technologies. The reason is that a carbon price low enough to avoid excessive output contraction and loss of market share to imports does not trigger sufficient investment in green technologies. In contrast, combining a tax with either an adoption subsidy or an output-based rebate increases domestic welfare. To quantify these effects, I estimate the model for the French cement industry, using a novel dataset that combines administrative data with handcollected firm announcements on the low-carbon investments following the recent escalation of the EU Emissions Trading System carbon price. Compared to the optimal carbon tax alone, a suitable combination of a tax and an adoption subsidy increases domestic welfare by up to 4.8% (and reduces emissions by 5.1%), and an output-based rebate tied to an efficiency benchmark can yield a domestic welfare gain of up to 8.5% (and reduces emissions by 14.9%). Once a carbon border adjustment extends the carbon price to imports, the gain from a subsidy largely vanishes, and that from an output-based rebate falls to 2.1%.