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Political Economy, Public, Development
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Politics at the Margin of Rule-Based Redistribution: Evidence from EU Cohesion Policy
How do politically motivated governments respond when institutional rules change where they retain discretion? I study this question in European Union Cohesion Policy, where Member States translate an indicative regional allocation into programmes and subsequently implement them, potentially under different governments. I compare the 2007–2013 and 2014–2020 programming periods, which differ in how discretion is distributed across these decisions. Combining a reconstruction of the Berlin Method with regional election results for 20 Member States, I distinguish political support for governments responsible for programme design from that of governments managing implementation. In 2007–2013, a ten-percentage-point increase in support for the design-stage cabinet is associated with approximately 13 percent higher regional expenditure relative to the Berlin allocation, a relationship absent in 2014–2020. During implementation, current cabinet support is associated with approximately 5 percent higher subsequent expenditure in 2014–2020, but not in 2007–2013. Additional evidence points primarily to changes in the regional distribution of resources rather than faster expenditure. These findings highlight how political incentives can remain relevant under rule-based redistribution, with their influence depending on the discretionary choices available throughout the policy process.