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Labor, Macroeconomics
Job market paper
Search Effort, Worker Attachment, and Labor Market Power
Firms’ wage-setting power is limited by workers’ outside options, which depend not only on the offers workers receive but on the offers they generate through costly search. This paper studies how search decisions and heterogeneous preferences over jobs jointly shape labor supply to firms. Using survey information on search behavior linked to Swedish employer–employee records, I show that search effort declines along the job ladder but remains substantial at top-ranked firms, where idiosyncratic, nonpecuniary reasons dominate.. Search is persistent and concentrated among a small group of workers. Guided by these facts, I develop a dynamic model with endogenous search effort and heterogeneous preferences. Higher pay retains workers both by making competing offers less attractive and by reducing search effort, which lowers their exposure to those offers. Relative to a benchmark that eliminates search responses, endogenous search raises the firm’s labor supply elasticity from 3.66 to 4.98, an increase of 36 percent, and lowers the implied markdown from 27 to 20 percent of pay. I show that aggregating individual search responses into firm labor supply requires accounting for both preference heterogeneity and the offer-arrival process.