Luiz Carpizo

Stanford University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Optimal Allocation Mechanisms with Externalities to Non-Consumers

We study the optimal allocation of a good whose consumption imposes negative externalities on non-consumers. A surplus-maximizing designer can impose access restrictions (e.g., bans or time limits), screen agents by charging for access, and condition the allocation on agents' observable characteristics (e.g., age). The main application is regulating social media platforms when non-users face social exclusion. We show that partial access restrictions are not optimal when non-consumers face worse externalities than consumers. We then provide conditions under which, for each observable group, the optimal allocation either grants access to all agents or bans the good entirely. Our results rationalize minimum age requirements for social media that several countries have adopted or proposed. We next study how non-consumer externalities affect agents' welfare when the designer maximizes revenue. We show that, if consumer externalities are positive, reducing the negative externalities on non-consumers need not increase aggregate welfare. This provides new insights into policies aimed at mitigating externalities on non-consumers.