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Industrial Organization, Public
Job market paper
Quality Regulation in Intermediation Markets: Evidence from the Real Estate Brokerage Industry
In intermediation markets, the quality of agent services is a key determinant of consumer welfare. However, intermediation markets are subject to quality underprovision due to two factors. First, search frictions limit consumers’ ability to observe agent quality. Second, agents’ incentives to invest in quality are attenuated when quality differences cannot be observed. Understanding the relative contribution of each factor can inform the design of remediation policies. In this paper, I study how heterogeneity in agent quality and consumer demand for quality shape welfare in intermediation markets. I answer this question by developing a model of buyer agent intermediation with heterogeneity in agent services, which I estimate using data on the US real estate brokerage market. In the model, agent recommendations maximize a weighted sum of buyer utility and agent earnings from commissions. Agents differ in the weights assigned to each, and in their ability to obtain lower prices for a given product. Using property transactions data from the Phoenix metro area, I find that, despite notable dispersion across agents in both measures of heterogeneity, demand for agent services is almost insensitive to these differences. Comparative statics exercises show that increasing demand sensitivity can sort consumers to high-quality agents, providing benefits in terms of housing consumption. Comparable effects can be achieved from the supply side only if a sufficiently high fraction of agents exhibits increases in their quality of service.