Website CV Paper
Fields
Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy, Public
Job market paper
Product Design Under Regulation: Evidence from the U.S. Automobile Market
Fuel economy standards are a central feature of climate policy in major automobile markets worldwide, and their effectiveness depends on how automakers respond by adjusting vehicle characteristics. This paper examines these endogenous design responses using a structural model of the U.S. passenger vehicle market from 2013 to 2022. I estimate a model in which automakers choose prices, horsepower, fuel economy, and investment in engine efficiency. Fuel economy standards are implemented through a credit trading system, entering the model as marginal regulatory costs for each vehicle. I identify preferences for fuel economy using variation in foreign fuel economy policy. Relative to no regulation, the observed standards raise average fuel economy by 1.0 percent and reduce horsepower by 1.4 percent. The welfare-maximizing car standard is 55 MPG, well above the observed 43 MPG, and achieves 39 percent of the welfare gain from a Pigouvian MPG tax. Replacing separate car and light truck standards with a single standard raises the welfare gain from the optimal standard by 9 percent, with automakers complying more by shifting sales toward cars and less by redesigning vehicles.