Vlasta Rasocha

Stanford University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Applied Micro, Political Economy

Job market paper

Hidden Identities, Stereotypes and Discrimination

When facing discrimination, some members of disadvantaged minority groups decide to hide signals of their minority status. We combine a theory of strategic hiding and two field experiments with Roma applicants and majority employers in the Czech Republic to study an important unintended consequence of hiding: Selection into hiding may skew the pool of minority applicants that employers can observe, influencing their perceptions of the minority group and discrimination in future hiring decisions. We find that selection into hiding creates a vicious cycle: Roma applicants with better education and job experience are almost twice as likely to hide their Roma identity by omitting Roma signals in resumes and are less likely to speak with a strong Roma accent in interviews. Employers are overconfident about their ability to detect Roma applicants and unaware of selection into hiding. As a result, selection into hiding increases employers' negative stereotypes about Roma applicants, accounting for about 40% of the gap in beliefs about Roma and non-Roma ability in our experiment, and reduces employers' willingness to review applications of detectable Roma candidates in the future.