Daria Matviienko

Stanford GSB · Economic Analysis and Policy · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Innovation, Finance

Job market paper

Regulatory Capture by Superstars: Lobbying, Innovation, and Industry Concentration

A long-established concern about corporate lobbying is regulatory capture: incumbent firms shaping regulation in their favor. We study which regulations firms lobby for and how this affects concentration, innovation, and welfare. Using LLMs, we classify federal lobbying reports of public firms and trade associations, assigning each request to a policy tool from a new comprehensive taxonomy, with the direction and scope of the requested change. Lobbying for firm-specific benefits such as tax decreases and government contracts is one-sided: nearly every firm asks for more. Lobbying over regulatory costs is instead contested: the largest firms are the most likely to ask for higher costs, while trade associations mostly ask for lower ones. To quantify the consequences of lobbying, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition and innovation in which firms lobby for firm-specific transfers and over industry-wide regulatory costs, set in a contest between strategic incumbents and an association of the competitive fringe. In the model estimated on US data, lobbying raises regulatory costs and lowers welfare through industry composition: each incumbent innovates more, but industries become more concentrated, lowering output and growth. Almost all the welfare loss comes from lobbying over regulation rather than for benefits.