Joey Feffer

Stanford GSB · Economic Analysis and Policy · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Optimal Auctions For Additive Goods: A Geometric Approach

I study the revenue-maximizing sale of multiple symmetric goods to multiple symmetric bidders, both in an unrestricted Bayesian setting and under simplicity requirements. Using a geometric representation of allocation rules, I characterize the designer's screening incentives in the unrestricted setting and identify a regularity condition under which global incentive constraints can be relaxed and optimal allocations are guided by endogenous virtual values. I then introduce a novel class of auctions called linked clock (proxy) auctions, which allow for coarse forms of multidimensional screening while maintaining dimensions of strategic simplicity. I show that optimal linked clock auctions allocate according to coarse virtual values derived from the model's primitives. These virtual values are coarsenings of the endogenous virtual values of the unrestricted setting, making precise how strategic simplicity restricts screening. Simulations show that optimal linked clock auctions achieve more than 99% of the estimated unrestricted optimal revenue in one benchmark setting and outperform separate selling by more than 20% in others.