Klajdi Hoxha

Stanford GSB · Economic Analysis and Policy · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory

Job market paper

Targeted Advertising Platforms: Pooling Audiences despite Poaching Risk

E-commerce platforms such as Shopify are inviting merchants to pool their audiences, creating a new kind of market where customer data are traded for targeted advertising. Pooling audiences can improve targeting but exposes merchants to customer poaching. I develop a model in which each customer has merchant-specific click-through rates and study how a platform can incentivize merchants to pool audiences despite poaching risk. In a market with finitely many merchants, I characterize the mechanism that maximizes a weighted sum of platform revenue, merchants' surplus, and customers' engagement with ads. I show that, as the number of merchants grows, an optimal mechanism converges to the unique optimal mechanism in a limit market, which offers merchants three options: (i) receive, at no charge, a campaign built on the pooled audience that delivers their baseline expected clicks, (ii) expand it by paying a posted buying price per additional click, or (iii) reduce it and receive a lower posted selling price per click forgone. Both prices are determined by endogenous virtual prices, which equal both the (weighted) marginal revenue and marginal cost of selling and procuring a click, respectively. Virtual prices also determine which customers are targeted by which merchants, through a comparative-advantage rule that compares relative rather than absolute click-through rates. I then characterize when the efficient platform design requires no outside subsidy and extend the analysis to settings where customers who do not click may be targeted by another merchant.