Vaibhav Rathi

Stockholm University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Political Economy, Development, Applied Micro, Labor

Job market paper

Political Influence, Bureaucratic Priorities, and Regulatory Process in India

Does political influence over bureaucracy make it more productive, or merely reorder its priorities? Using a novel data source with the life cycle of large investment projects, I build a panel that captures regulatory processing for government and private projects. Using party alignment between the local politician and the state ruling party as a measure of the politician's influence, I design two empirical designs to test the effect of political influence: an event study and a close-election RD. Both designs give consistent results that tell me that politicians use their influence to capture bureaucratic attention, changing the composition of bureaucratic output but not the total output. When political influence is high, bureaucrats shift their output towards government projects that come at the cost of private projects, and the share of private projects in the output goes down by 16 pp, roughly 41% of the baseline. The one-period success rate of private projects waiting in the queue also goes down by around 6 pp, roughly half of the baseline. Outcomes for government projects improve by a similar amount. Evidence suggests that bureaucrats give higher priority to influential politicians because of career returns. A back-of-the-envelope calculation implies about 4 months of additional delay per private project and 0.29 million private jobs deferred, caused by political capture of bureaucracy. Regulatory reforms are common prescriptions to promote investment, but the paper argues that the political economy of regulatory implementation might also be important to improve the regulatory environment.