Website CV Paper
Fields
Theory, Behavioral & Experimental
Job market paper
Communication and Information Acquisition in Committees
Many collective decisions rely on costly information acquisition by group members, giving rise to a free-riding problem. This paper examines how pre-vote communication affects this problem. I present a model in which voters with common interests decide whether to acquire private information before voting, and compare institutions with and without an intermediate communication stage. The model identifies two opposing effects: communication raises the incentive to acquire information by allowing a member's signal to influence others' votes (persuasion effect), but lowers it by making others' information a closer substitute for one's own (substitution effect). In equilibrium, communication increases information acquisition and improves group accuracy and welfare when information is relatively expensive, but reduces them when information is relatively cheap. I test these predictions in a pre-registered laboratory experiment with three-member committees. Communication increases acquisition when information is expensive, as predicted, but does not reduce it when information is cheap, and it improves group accuracy and welfare at both cost levels. Additional evidence helps explain the missing downside: subjects recognize the persuasion effect but insufficiently account for the substitution effect, leading them to overvalue information acquisition under communication.