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Finance, Macroeconomics
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Sticky Deposits, Leverage Relief, and Bank Lending
I study how bank lending responds to temporary leverage relief when deposits are sticky. Methodologically, I embed deposit stickiness in a euro-area-calibrated general equilibrium model with heterogeneously capitalized banks that face idiosyncratic loan and deposit shocks, a leverage ratio requirement, and equity issuance costs. Leverage relief temporarily excludes reserves from the leverage ratio. Leverage relief raises lending through two channels. Through a leverage channel, less-capitalized banks lend more because losses no longer force them to issue equity while the relief lasts. Through an equity channel, banks that avoid issuance accumulate less equity, which counterintuitively also boosts lending. As an undercapitalized bank loses equity, issuance at the end of the relief becomes near-certain. A loss then raises the amount issued as much as a gain lowers it, so the bank weighs gains and losses equally. As undercapitalized banks supply more loans, returns to lending fall and better-capitalized banks lend less. Four quarters of leverage relief increase bank lending by up to 0.9% above steady state, but lending falls to 0.6% below steady state once the relief ends, because banks hold less equity. Lastly, after a deposit inflow into the banking system, leverage relief raises lending more during the relief but is followed by a deeper contraction.