Cameron Chahal

University of Toronto · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Health, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Provider Choice and the Allocation of Healthcare Capacity: Evidence from Pharmacist Prescribing

Expanding health care supply can change both who seeks treatment and how scarce physician capacity is allocated. I study these economic mechanisms through Canadian reforms allowing pharmacists to assess and prescribe for minor ailments, in a publicly funded system where wait times rather than monetary prices shape access. Exploiting staggered prescribing reforms across Canadian provinces, I find suggestive increases in prescription use and reductions in hospital cases involving minor ailments and their progression to more serious conditions. I then estimate a structural equilibrium model using linked Ontario administrative data, in which patients decide whether and where to seek care, physicians allocate capacity between minor and nonminor ailments, and wait times clear the physician market. I use a measure of physician efficiency as a proxy for unobserved wait times. Separately, I assess pharmacist care quality through downstream follow-up assessments and disease progression, finding fewer follow-ups and no statistically significant increase in progression. In a counterfactual without pharmacists, formal care seeking falls by 8.7%, while the physician share among care seekers rises from 87.46% to 97.01%. However, physicians increase their average capacity allocation toward minor ailments only from 4.91% to 4.97%, leaving much of the adjustment to longer underlying wait times. Together, the loss of a treatment option and longer underlying wait times reduce consumer surplus. These findings demonstrate that pharmacist prescribing improves access beyond patients directly treated at pharmacies by easing pressure on physician care.