Farhang Shamsoddin

University of Toronto · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Econometrics

Job market paper

The Misallocation Costs of Bid Rigging: Evidence from Montreal Asphalt Procurement Auctions

This paper examines the misallocation costs of collusion in public procurement auctions using data from the Montreal asphalt cartel of 2007–2009. I estimate firm-specific cost distributions nonparametrically from the post-cartel period and simulate competitive counterfactual outcomes for each cartel-period auction. First, I find that the cartel inflated average procurement prices by 24 percent. Second, the inefficient allocation of contracts in the cartel period increased total production costs by 14.1 percent. Third, decomposing the price overcharge, 58.4 percent is attributable to misallocation of contracts toward higher-cost firms and the remaining 41.6 percent to higher collusive markups. These findings suggest that in markets with substantial dispersion in firm productivity, inefficient allocation may be the primary channel through which bid-rigging harms public buyers.