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Industrial Organization, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Fewer Buyers, Higher Pay? Monopsony and Product Market Power in the U.S. Publishing Industry
In 2022, a U.S. federal court blocked the merger of Penguin Random House and Simon & Schuster, the first U.S. merger halted solely on the basis of harm to an input market. Standard monopsony analyses hold firms’ input valuations fixed, yet a merger that raises downstream pricing power raises the profits an input generates, and with it every firm’s willingness to pay. This paper quantifies both channels in a unified framework and applies it to the blocked merger. Using a new dataset linking retail book sales to the corresponding manuscript acquisitions, I first document that, after the most recent merger between large publishers, advances declined for authors with a bestseller but increased for debut and mid-list authors. Reduced competition for manuscripts alone cannot explain these changes. I then develop and estimate a structural model that links ascending-bid auctions for manuscripts to differentiated-products demand and multiproduct price competition in the retail book market. Simulating the blocked merger, consumer surplus falls by $19.9 million (−2.5%) while aggregate advances rise by $20.3 million (10.2%): advances fall for the manuscripts the merging publishers jointly contested but rise across the much larger remainder of the market, where heightened downstream profitability lifts every publisher’s bids. An upstream-only analysis of the same estimated model predicts a decline in author compensation, mis-signing the effect of a merger on authors.