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Industrial Organization, Finance
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Collusion beyond Prices: Product Variety and Welfare in the LCD Panel Industry
How does a price-fixing cartel affect product variety and welfare? A cartel can coordinate not only prices but also which products firms offer. Once collusion can extend beyond prices, the total welfare impact of a cartel depends on how far its members coordinate their product offerings and becomes a priori ambiguous: changes in product variety may reinforce or offset the damages from higher prices. I study this question in the LCD panel industry, where six major firms operated a cartel from 2001 to 2006. Antitrust case documents show price coordination and suggest some coordination of product offerings. Using sales and engineering cost data, I estimate a model of demand with endogenous product choices, and I infer bounds on fixed costs from the products that firms offer. I find that the product variety observed after the cartel's collapse was not socially excessive and may have been insufficient. Counterfactual simulations show that, had the cartel not collapsed, it would have raised the number of products by 12% if its members colluded only on prices and reduced it by 14% if they also coordinated their product offerings. Regardless of product coordination, however, the price effect dominates: buyer surplus would have been 19% and 23% lower, and total surplus 10% and 11% lower, respectively. Measured against the socially optimal portfolio, Bertrand competition attains 93% of its total surplus, whereas the two forms of collusion attain 83% and 82%.