Xiaoya Gao

University of Toronto · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Theory

Job market paper

Incentive Compatibility in Experiments with Incomplete Preferences

The revealed preference methodology that is the cornerstone of the economic toolkit that enables the inference of ranking from observable choices usually presume completeness, which is one of the most contested assumptions in choice theory. I study incentive compatibility in experiments that allow subjects to report incomplete preferences. To distinguish incomparability from indifference, I attach a sure monetary payment to each option and require incomparability to survive small changes in that payment. I show that the frontier of incentive compatibility under incomplete preferences is comparable-side strict incentive compatibility: subjects have a strict incentive to report truthfully when they can compare two options, and only a weak incentive when they cannot. Reported incomparability is therefore a conservative measure that never overstates incompleteness. I construct a class of mechanisms that attain this frontier and apply to any domain. In a laboratory experiment, these mechanisms also prove behaviorally incentive compatible.