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Macroeconomics, Econometrics
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The Policy Duet: Coordination in U.S. Monetary–Fiscal Communication
Monetary and fiscal authorities regularly communicate their assessments of the economy, yet the macroeconomic effects of alignment between their messages remain poorly understood. To study these effects, I construct a new dataset of approximately 250,000 U.S. policy documents from the Federal Reserve, Treasury, White House, and Congress spanning 1911–2025. Using this dataset, I build a communication coordination index that measures alignment between monetary and fiscal authorities' messages about inflation. I identify coordination shocks in a structural VAR estimated over 1951–2025, using political proximity between Fed policymakers and the congressional majority as an external instrument. A positive coordination shock raises real activity, inflation, and short-term interest rates. Counterfactual analysis suggests that a substantial part of the expansion operates through lower uncertainty about real economic conditions. A New Keynesian model with imperfect information rationalizes these findings: households observe current demand conditions but cannot distinguish their persistent and transitory components. More aligned signals from monetary and fiscal authorities improve households' inference, reducing uncertainty and precautionary saving, thereby stimulating aggregate demand.