Website CV Paper
Fields
Industrial Organization, Econometrics
Job market paper
Decoding Rankings: Consumer Search, Price Competition, and Platform Regulation
Online platforms often guide consumer choice through ranked lists. Consumers benefit from a ranking ordered by consumer surplus, but the platform gains from steering them toward high-commission offers. The platform's actual ranking balances these interests through a weight on commission. Consumers learn about this monetization weight and adjust their search accordingly, so the effect of steering depends on the gap between the actual and perceived weights. Using Expedia data, we estimate a structural model of consumer search and hotel pricing that separately identifies both weights. We find that consumers substantially under-perceive monetization and overtrust the ranking. Because steering distorts demand and price competition, regulators debate two remedies: transparency corrects consumers' interpretation of the ranking, and neutrality removes commission from the ranking's objective. We find that transparency alone lowers consumer welfare, and neutrality alone yields a limited gain. The policies are complements and combining them benefits consumers most.