Lony Bessagnet

Toulouse School of Economics · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Theory, Education, Labor

Job market paper

Feedback Policy and Anticipated Peer Comparison: Theory and Experiment

Whenever individuals receive feedback about how they perform, organizations also choose what to reveal about their peers' performance. I show theoretically that this choice changes how much effort individuals exert in anticipation of the feedback, even absent material consequences. This is because they care about how they compare to peers. Comparing effort across three feedback policies identifies two motives: a competitive motive to outperform peers, and an information motive to shape what they will learn about their own relative ability. In a lab experiment, I elicit each participant's effort under the three policies to quantify the motives at the individual level. I find that the competitive motive raises average effort and the information motive lowers it. Because individuals differ in these motives, changing the feedback policy also changes who performs best. Information about peers' performance is thus a cheap motivator, but it shapes the rankings that guide organizations' selection decisions.