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Industrial Organization, Health, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Retention by Design: Long-term Contracts in Health Insurance
This paper studies how regulation designed to protect consumers from rising premiums as their health worsens shapes competition and welfare when insurers have market power. In Chile, insurers commit to long-term premium schedules, while consumers remain free to switch plans. Using administrative data on plan choices and medical claims, we document that healthier individuals are more likely to switch plans. Leveraging demographic differences across groups of similar plans, we find that newly introduced plans help insurers retain switchers. To quantify how consumer switching and insurers' retention strategies jointly affect prices and welfare, we develop and estimate a supply and demand model in which insurers set prices upon introduction, anticipating future enrollment, costs, and own and rivals' plan offerings. In counterfactuals, we find that banning new plan introductions reduces insurers' costs but raises premiums by 13%, reducing the number of enrolled individuals. In a second counterfactual, in which both consumers and insurers commit to their plan for life, costs fall but consumer surplus is lower as individuals lose the flexibility to adjust coverage when their health needs change. Our findings show that policies can reduce insurers' costs without making consumers better off.