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Macroeconomics, Econometrics, Labor, Theory
Job market paper
Bargaining, Matching Efficiency and Unemployment Fluctuations
This paper argues that time-varying efficiency of wage bargaining provides a novel source of unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle. Using business-cycle accounting, we show that a canonical search-and-matching model accounts for U.S. unemployment and vacancy fluctuations only if matching efficiency and the firm's surplus share are procyclical and move together. To rationalize this comovement, we develop a model in which the worker is more likely to accept a more generous wage offer, so the firm trades off a larger share of the surplus against a higher probability of agreement. Higher productivity or lower bargaining uncertainty relaxes this trade-off, so the agreement probability, which plays the role of endogenous matching efficiency, rises together with the firm's surplus share in booms. Quantitatively, the model can reproduce the firm's measured surplus share while generating 86% of the volatility of measured matching efficiency. This microfounded comovement allows the model to account for the full volatility of unemployment and to match the joint fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies better than models without bargaining uncertainty and with constant matching efficiency.