Nicolás Oviedo-Dávila

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona · Economics (IDEA) · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Finance, Theory, Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy

Job market paper

The Allocation of Blended Finance

Blended finance is an emerging practice that combines private capital with subsidies to support economic development and environmental protection. Such subsidies are often needed because social benefits are not fully reflected in firms' financial returns. I study how an investor allocates a limited subsidy budget of this nature to increase the value projects create for society. Crucially, the subsidy has two competing uses. It can encourage firms that already attract private investment to generate greater social benefits, or make financing possible for firms that would otherwise remain unfunded. Two information frictions make this allocation challenging: firms privately know their capacity to generate social benefits, and their managerial actions cannot be observed or enforced through contracts. I show that, together, these frictions require the investor to pay firms informational rents when rewarding social benefits, raising the cost of these incentives. This favors directing subsidies toward otherwise unfunded projects, especially when little financial assistance is needed. New evidence constructed through AI-assisted text analysis of project-level narratives supports this allocation, with most subsidized projects receiving support to attract private investment. Simulations of a calibrated model show how subsidy budgets and the value assigned to social benefits shape the optimal allocation differently, and why financing more projects can create less value for society.