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The Outside Option Channel of Central Bank Asset Purchase Programs: A Tale of Two Crises
This paper proposes the outside option channel of central bank asset purchase programs. Central banks purchase assets traded in over-the-counter (OTC) secondary markets with substantial matching frictions and bilateral bargaining. In this context, an asset purchase announcement improves the seller's outside option in bargaining, thereby increasing asset prices even without actual purchases. I model this channel and examine how optimal purchase policies depend on the source of distress and central bank purchase costs. A welfare-improving intervention always exists when the central bank's holding cost does not exceed that of distressed sellers, because intervention alleviates the OTC hold-up problem that depresses primary-market investment. The model helps explain why the Federal Reserve purchased more than $1 trillion of agency MBS during the global financial crisis but only $14 billion of corporate bonds during the COVID crisis despite stabilizing both markets. The model also shows that asset purchases and liquidity provision policies target different margins in OTC markets: asset purchases improve sellers' outside options, whereas liquidity provision relaxes buyers' funding constraints. When the buyers' constraint is binding, an asset purchase announcement can lower primary-market demand.