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Estimating Tax Elasticities along the Income Distribution
The elasticity of earnings with respect to taxation governs the trade-off between redistribution and efficiency, but available designs identify it only for specific ranges of income (at a threshold in bunching designs, for the group a reform affects in reform designs). This paper proposes a strategy to estimate the elasticity along the income distribution. It builds on the observation that, under a tax system that taxes spousal income jointly and gives tax advantages for children, individuals with the same earnings are differentially likely to see a tax change when the composition of the tax unit changes (a child leaves, a couple marries). The strategy formalises such comparisons and isolates the variation that stems from partner earnings. In a panel built from the universe of French tax returns, the earnings elasticity declines from 0.45 in the bottom decile to 0.23 in the middle deciles and to below 0.1 in the top decile. The profile is shifted up for women and at older ages, and the lowest earners' participation response comes from those with higher-earning partners. Accounting for this heterogeneity flattens optimal tax rates at low incomes and alters the predicted effects of reforms towards individual taxation.