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Macroeconomics, Industrial Organization, Innovation, Labor
Job market paper
Multi-Market Firms: Markups, Size, and Misallocation
Large firms are believed to hold the most market power, and models of oligopoly attribute a firm’s markup to its share of a single market. Yet firms often sell in many markets. Using market research data that record the sales of consumer goods firms in every product category and country they sell in, matched to firm financials, I document three facts. First, markups are flat in a firm’s average market share. Second, markups rise with the number and the size of the markets a firm is in. Third, larger markets have more competitors, lower top shares and a lower Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Together, the facts suggest that a firm’s markup depends on which markets it sells in rather than on its share of them. I rationalize them in an oligopoly model in which multi-market firms choose which markets to enter and invest in customer attachment, which lowers the elasticity of the demand they face. The return to attachment scales with market size while its cost rises less than proportionally, so markups rise with market size at any share, while entry makes larger markets more crowded. In the calibrated model, 85% of the variance of markups across firm-market pairs is between markets, so firm size is a poor guide to markups. As a result, a subsidy that rises with firm size removes only about 10% of misallocation, while one that varies with market size removes nearly 90%.