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Macroeconomics, Finance, Innovation
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Bank Market Power and Interest Rate Risk
How does bank market power in funding and lending jointly shape loan composition and monetary transmission under interest rate uncertainty? We document that banks with less rate-sensitive funding costs charge a higher fixed-rate premium over variable-rate loans, even though stable funding makes fixed-rate lending an earnings hedge. Lending concentration helps explain this pattern: banks in more concentrated lending markets exhibit a higher premium, conditional on funding sensitivity. They also expand fixed-rate credit more after monetary tightening. Our two-date model explains pricing through banks’ trade-off between earnings from restricting fixed-rate lending and its hedging benefits. A restriction on relative market power reproduces the negative premium–sensitivity slope. Holding funding power fixed, greater lending competition increases fixed-rate protection and attenuates investment contraction following monetary tightening. In a calibrated equilibrium with heterogeneous banks, higher rates induce entry that strengthens both funding and lending competition and, overall, cushions investment contraction. The aggregate outcome conceals opposing responses across banks. Under committed loan contracts, eliminating lender segmentation reduces the contraction following a 50-basis-point rate increase by approximately 20%. Greater bank risk-bearing capacity reduces fixed-rate lending with little effect on investment.