Ali Haider Ismail

University of California, Los Angeles · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Finance, Economic History

Job market paper

Welfare Implications of Reserve Regimes

The Federal Reserve is considering a return to scarce reserves, yet we lack a measure of the welfare trade-offs between reserve regimes. We provide one. In our general equilibrium model, banks hold reserves to settle random deposit flows, then close their positions by borrowing or lending reserves in a frictional interbank market. Monetary policy sets the return on reserves and the cost of running short at the discount window. Banks choose reserves, loans and deposits jointly, so their demand for reserves is endogenous and policy moves all three. We prove an irrelevance theorem: interbank frictions and the quantity of reserves do not affect welfare under a deterministic deposit outflow, a flat loan demand and net settlement. These are the conditions under which the measure of Lucas (2000) covers the full welfare cost. Otherwise, reserves affect welfare through the wedges they open between the risk-free rate and the deposit and loan rates. The welfare cost then has two parts: the area under the deposit demand curve, the traditional measure since Bailey (1956); and an area under the loan demand curve, which we call the loan channel. Raising inflation to 10%, with the real discount window rate held fixed, costs 0.50% of consumption relative to the Friedman rule when banks finance the loan share of business capital in the Financial Accounts. The cost rises to 3.1% when banks finance all capital, so the loan channel matters quantitatively.