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Finance, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Design of the U.S. Treasury Secondary Market: Venue Sorting, Competing Mechanisms, and Allocative Efficiency
Is the current fragmented structure of the U.S. Treasury secondary market, in which centralized and decentralized venues coexist, optimal? This paper develops a venue-choice model to study allocative efficiency under current and alternative market structures as aggregate risk varies. Venues differ in their pricing and matching mechanisms, and agents sort across venues based on the tradeoff between execution certainty and transaction costs. When aggregate risk is low, gains from trade are primarily realized through trading in the centralized venue, the central limit order book, which mitigates inefficiencies associated with search frictions in the decentralized over-the-counter venue. However, as aggregate risk increases, adverse selection intensifies for limit orders, discouraging limit-order submission and reducing order book depth, while agents substitute toward decentralized over-the-counter trading and recover gains from trade that would otherwise be lost. Quantifying the model using transaction-level U.S. Treasury data, this paper finds that the current hybrid market structure achieves 87 percent of the first-best allocation, outperforming both over-the-counter-only and fully centralized market structures. These findings rationalize the current fragmented market.