Theodore Naff

University of California, Los Angeles · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, International, Labor

Job market paper

Human Capital Insurance

The costs of losing a job can persist long after unemployment ends. Long-tenured workers who permanently separate from their employers suffer large earnings losses even after finding new jobs. This paper studies human capital insurance, which protects workers against persistent losses in earning capacity. I develop a life-cycle model in which workers accumulate imperfectly portable human capital and face displacement risk and costly job search. I show that uninsured displacement risk discourages human capital investment, while appropriately age-dependent insurance can restore efficient investment incentives and complement conventional unemployment insurance. I calibrate the model to employment and earnings outcomes of trade-displaced workers denied Trade Adjustment Assistance and evaluate its predictions using the age-50 eligibility cutoff for Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance (RTAA), an existing wage-insurance program. RTAA improves welfare at modest fiscal cost but closes a smaller share of the constrained-efficient welfare gap than conventional unemployment insurance. Extending wage insurance to a broader population can generate comparable welfare gains, but requires substantially greater fiscal outlays.