Esmeralda Gerritse

Université catholique de Louvain · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Political Economy, Behavioral & Experimental

Job market paper

When We Cooperate: Wage Changes in Healthy Firm's Acquisitions by Workers

There have been several redistribution propositions of firms' voting rights in decision-making instances to the workers on the basis that this would improve working conditions. While previous studies have focused on firms where workers are given minority of rights, this paper studies the acquisition of the majority rights by the workforce and its effect on wages and the wage distribution. By exploiting a rich employer-employee matched database for the universe of French firms, I analyse the effect of healthy acquisitions by workers on wages for different thresholds of rights in the workforce. Using the imputation method, I estimate a positive effect of the change in the control structure on the gross average wage, which increases of 2 percent overall and by 6.3 percent in firms where the voting base is large. However, I find no pay compression. Wage gains are concentrated among the higher pay quantiles and occupational levels, although decreasingly so with the percentage of the workforce holding rights. This increase does not seem to be driven by a change in productivity, but rather by a collective decision. When decomposing the effect in contractual wage and profit-sharing, I find that both components contribute to the increase in the gross pay