Website CV Paper
Fields
Behavioral & Experimental, Theory, Agricultural, Environmental & Energy, Applied Micro, Education
Job market paper
Differing Priors and Information Acquisition When Others Make the Decision
Should you pay more for information when someone else will act on it instead of you? Standard Bayesian theory predicts it should not matter, and this paper tests that prediction experimentally. Pairs face the Bayesian decision problem of purchasing a signal about a binary state. I elicit first- and second-order posterior beliefs to evaluate the effects of different priors on belief updating. Then, I independently vary (i) whether participants share common or differing prior beliefs when eliciting their posteriors, and (ii) whether the information purchaser is also the final decisionmaker. Three main results emerge. First, participants expect others to update beliefs similarly to themselves. Second, sensitivity to information predicts willingness to pay (WTP): participants who put more weight on the signal bid more to implement their own strategy. Third, participants exposed to differing priors bid more to implement their own strategy than the other participant's, a premium absent with common priors. This premium is not explained by the instrumental value of the strategy, which is consistent with a non-instrumental value of decision rights that becomes salient when beliefs may differ. This has implications for organizational information acquisition and delegation design.