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Quota Baskets Versus Tax Baskets in Fisheries
Because managing stocks individually is costly, many fisheries bundle multiple stocks and manage them with a single instrument. I study when such bundling is desirable and whether it should take the form of a shared quota or a shared landing fee, extending the work of Reed (1979) and Weitzman (2002) to a multispecies fishery under ecological uncertainty. A well-designed basket groups species whose marginal profits at their own optimal escapements are similar, a criterion that combines biological productivity, harvesting costs, and prices. Under ecological uncertainty, the tax basket outperforms the quota basket. However, as the number of species in the group increases and shocks are independent across species, the quota's uncertainty loss is diversified away per species, and the total welfare gap settles at a positive constant. Yet increasing the basket size has a second cost: the mismatch from pooling heterogeneous species grows with the number of species for both instruments. Larger baskets are not always better. Bundling improves on species-specific management only when the monitoring cost savings exceed this mismatch loss.