Dongkeun Choi

University of California, San Diego · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Finance

Job market paper

Unintended Risks of Bank Capital Regulation

I show that tighter bank capital regulation can increase aggregate credit risk by shifting credit supply toward nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) that operate outside the scope of regulation. Using U.S. mortgage data, I document that NBFIs approve observably similar applicants at higher rates than banks and that NBFI loans have higher default rates. I show that tighter bank capital regulation contributed to a shift in credit toward riskier borrowers with higher default rates. I develop a general equilibrium model in which banks and NBFIs choose loan rates and underwriting standards. In the model, tighter regulation leads banks to raise loan rates and tighten underwriting standards, shifting applicants toward NBFIs. NBFIs' looser underwriting standards extend credit to applicants who would otherwise remain unfunded, increasing aggregate credit risk. The model further shows that tighter regulation can amplify credit losses from adverse financial shocks.