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Applied Micro, Macroeconomics
Job market paper
Regulatory Capture via Relative Prices
Regulations can increase marginal costs by different proportions across firms. Every price rises, but the least burdened firms raise their prices least. They become relatively cheaper, attract demand, and gain revenue, profit, and market share. I find evidence of this mechanism under the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) using Nielsen scanner data. Large firms supported the act, which disproportionately affected their smaller competitors. They grew in regulated categories but not in similar unaffected placebos. For example, in oil-roasted nuts two firms with a 10:1 revenue ratio before the act ended with a 30:1 ratio afterward, with no effect on the raw-nuts placebo. The general-equilibrium estimates imply a welfare cost of at least $362 million per year, with only the largest sixth to third of firms benefiting. This paper brings Raising Rivals' Costs to differentiated goods and general equilibrium.