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Environmental & Energy, Public
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The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
We build and linearize a new analytical general equilibrium model with "good" and "bad" forms of waste disposal, when "ugly" illegal disposal cannot be taxed or effectively regulated. This model can apply to any pollution problem in the air, water, or land. We find closed-form solutions for changes in each outcome from a small change in tax, and we use those expressions in a welfare function to find closed-form solutions for levels of the two second-best optimal tax rates (which depend on all damages, elasticities, and share parameters). The tax on bad disposal might be less than the tax on good disposal, or even less than zero, if bad disposal is the best substitute for ugly disposal. We calibrate the model for numerical illustrations and show how partial equilibrium elasticities and parameters combine with resource constraints and revenue requirements to determine very different general equilibrium elasticities for effects on each outcome. These general equilibrium outcomes are what matter to set the two optimal tax rates.