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Applied Micro, Econometrics, Industrial Organization, Theory
Job market paper
Contest Design and Racing Behavior: Evidence from NASCAR
In 2017, NASCAR changed the design of the races, transforming them from singlestage contests with prizes allocated at the end to multi-stage contests with intermediate prizes to make its races more exciting. I exploit this rule change to analyze dynamic strategic effort and risk-taking responses in this high-stakes environment. I find that the change incentivizes drivers to modify their efforts during the race. Lagging participants conserve their cars by reducing speed ahead of planned stoppages, while drivers on the margins of earning prizes increase their speed. Nuanced measures of effort such as passing and crashing support these findings while also pointing out key differences between the introduced stages and random events that occur during all races. These changes made NASCAR races overall more exciting, but not to the extent that NASCAR may have wanted.