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Macroeconomics, Behavioral & Experimental, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Communication Frictions, Managerial Expectations, and Firm Dynamics
This paper studies how imperfect communication within firms shapes managerial expectations, input choices, and aggregate productivity. I develop a dynamic model of team production in which capital and labor managers share the firm's objective but observe different information about productivity. The model yields restrictions on forecast-error predictability that jointly identify communication frictions and behavioral distortions in expectations data. Empirically, investment forecasts of U.S. public firms simultaneously underreact to news about hiring and overreact to news about investment. Complementary evidence from U.S. manufacturing establishments shows that managerial forecasts underreact more to news about the other manager's decision when capital and labor decisions are made at different locations. Together, these findings are inconsistent with the common-information benchmark and support a model of firm dynamics with communication frictions. Quantitatively, communication friction generates substantial variations in the capital-labor ratio and large input misallocation. The associated aggregate productivity loss is approximately 5% relative to the frictionless allocation. This productivity loss is moderated by the negative covariance between the marginal revenue products generated by the communication friction.