David Ontaneda

University of Michigan · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Finance, Development

Job market paper

Selective Outreach and Targeted Interest Rate Caps

This paper studies how interest rate caps that target one sector affect lending and welfare when lenders selectively contact potential borrowers. Using a reform that introduced an interest rate cap on agricultural loans in Ecuador, I document that after the reform, cooperatives’ lending shifted toward the non-agricultural sector while banks’ agricultural lending expanded. I estimate a model of selective outreach in which lending reflects lenders’ offer and borrowers’ acceptance decisions. By lowering prices, a cap can increase acceptance while reducing lenders’ incentive to extend offers, and targeting can lead to cross-sector offer reallocation. I find that banks and cooperatives reduced offers to agricultural borrowers, outweighing the increase in acceptance and reducing aggregate agricultural lending and welfare. The regulation shifted acceptance toward banks, whose prices fell more due to the cap, allowing their lending to increase despite fewer offers. Targeting magnified the offer contraction, accounting for most of the lending reduction and generating welfare losses in the agricultural sector. A less stringent cap would have raised agricultural borrowers’ consumer surplus. The results show that, by influencing the relative strength of the offer and acceptance responses, policy design shapes the cap’s ultimate effects.