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Theory, Behavioral & Experimental
Job market paper
Attention Costs and Strategic Communication
This paper studies how the value of sender commitment depends on the nature of a receiver's costly attention. I consider a common-interest sender–receiver game in which the receiver imperfectly perceives messages and chooses attention optimally. I compare listening costs, which depend on the mechanical accuracy of perception, with processing costs, which depend on mutual information, and allow attention to be either selective across messages or non-selective. The sender's message strategy affects both the benefits and, under processing costs, the costs of attention. When attention is non-selective, commitment provides only an equilibrium-selection benefit: binary action recommendation is already implementable without commitment. With selective attention and listening costs, commitment can create a strict surplus by allowing the sender to credibly distinguish states with the same optimal action but different stakes, thereby directing attention more effectively. The analysis also suggests that this benefit is weaker under processing costs, which directly penalize finer message distinctions.