Website CV Paper
Fields
Macroeconomics, International
Job market paper
A Theory of Wage Solidarity, Coordination Failures and Long Term Involuntary Unemployment
This work provides a novel theoretical model to explain the existence and changes in long term involuntary unemployment through coordination failures under conditions of wage solidarity in the labor market. Wage solidarity in the model requires that workers can only be employed at the wage fixed by a labor union. Under conditions of wage solidarity in the labor market, optimal price setting by monopolist firms fixes the real wage, irrespective of the nominal wage set by the labor union. In the absence of communication between firms, their optimal quantity decisions depend on their beliefs regarding the behavior of other agents, especially the quantity decisions of other firms. If it so happens that the beliefs of all the firm owners are such that each assumes the others to produce at a level less than full employment (and in the correct ratios), then their optimal quantity decisions will be such that each of their beliefs regarding the quantity decisions of the others is satisfied or is at least not contradicted/questioned/challenged. In this work, I argue that such an outcome is an equilibrium. As a result, we have involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. To argue this point, I present a definition of an equilibrium inspired by (though not identical to) Nash equilibrium and show how the present case meets this definition. Finally, I explain that the involuntary unemployment problem can be solved without changing the institutional setup (the wage solidary norm) by directly attacking the coordination failure.