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International, Industrial Organization, Finance, Macroeconomics
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Trade Credit Delay and the Real Effects of Prompt-Payment Regulations
About one-quarter of trade-credit obligations are paid late. Using granular Dun & Bradstreet payment records, we show that delays are selective: larger buyers delay a greater share of payment experiences, but not a greater share of dollars, and their delayed invoices are disproportionately small relative to their average payment size. We build a dynamic model in which buyers optimally delay trade credit payment by trading off the working-capital benefits of delayed payment against the risk of losing relationship-specific suppliers. We estimate the model by the simulated method of moments, targeting payment speed and supplier relationships. Motivated by prompt-payment regulation, we evaluate a mandate requiring full on-time payment. The mandate reduces mean supplier exit probability from 5.38 to 2.58 percent and supports a larger active supplier base with less new relationship formation. Inputs and capital demand increase, raising output by 1.21 percent despite the loss of financing through delayed payment. Total input expenditure rises by 2.85 percent. Buyers replace delayed-payment financing primarily with cash; cash holdings rise by about 60 percent and bank borrowing by 15 percent. Dividends and firm value increase only slightly.