Matthew Hockert

University of Minnesota · Applied Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Public

Job market paper

Do Local Income Taxes Cause Residential Sorting? Evidence from Pennsylvania’s Piecewise Earned Income Tax

Do local income taxes cause residential sorting? Pennsylvania’s Earned Income Tax follows a piecewise max-rule where a resident pays the higher of the home-side rates and the workplace rate. The rule creates variation that is used to identify a causal effect. I decompose statutory increases by whether the home-side stack already binds, becomes binding, or never binds, and the never-binding cell is a within-design placebo. I estimate a continuous stacked difference-in-differences design on block-level LEHD/LODES data aggregated to municipalities over 2002–2019. The average causal response to a binding increase is a 0.537 log-point decline per percentage point in the count of workers who both live and work in their own municipality, about a 12% decline at the average cumulative increase of 0.24 percentage points, while the placebo cell is null. The results are robust to multiple tests and specifications. While the headline results originate from a linear model, I run a polynomial and spline specification as well. The two are able to trace the full dose-response, the total and marginal effect at each dose: the effect accumulates steeply across the increases and flattens as they grow. The largest decline comes from the first increase, and each subsequent increase moves fewer workers, consistent with a shrinking pool of residents willing to relocate. All three specifications return similar results. The binding cell passes a set of pre-trend tests and shows no effect at three fake-timing placebo dates. Controlling for municipal, school-district, and county effective property-tax rates shows the property tax’s effect is about a third of the EIT’s per percentage point.