Angelo Mendes

University of Minnesota · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Finance, International

Job market paper

Bank Runs and Market Value Solvency

How does run risk shape banks’ demand for long bonds? Interest rate hikes lower long-duration bond prices, exposing banks to runs from uninsured depositors. Yet, long bonds hedge fluctuations in deposit spreads while depositors stay in the bank: when rates fall and compress deposit margins, long bonds pay off. We study a model in which banks choose dividends and a portfolio of short and long bonds, and uninsured depositors play a coordination game that makes runs likely when banks are poorly capitalized. We show that run risk affects banks’ hedging incentives and concentrates demand for long bonds in banks with intermediate levels of capitalization. Using U.S. Call Reports, we document that such behavior is consistent with the data, and calibrate the model to match the cross-sectional distribution of bank portfolios. We then use the model to study policies discussed since the Regional Banking Crisis of 2023. We show that along the observed path of rates, assigning risk weights to long bonds and uninsured deposits reduces deposits involved in failures by 15%, but increases deposits at failing banks in at least half of interest rate paths. On the other hand, deposit insurance coverage alleviates coordination failures by reducing depositors’ incentives to run, raising welfare in the economy.