Lucas Belmudes

University of Minnesota · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

International, Macroeconomics, Finance

Job market paper

Domestic vs. Foreign Law: Portfolio Dynamics of Sovereign Debt

Emerging-market governments borrow both under their own law and under foreign law. If the government defaults, the governing law determines whether domestic or foreign courts settle disputes, and so how much investors recover. For twelve governments, we document that all borrow under both laws, that each issues its foreign-law debt at longer duration, and that issuing under foreign law costs a fee proportional to the money raised and independent of maturity. We show that the yield gap between a government’s bonds under the two laws widens with the probability of default. We build a quantitative model of sovereign default in which the government cannot commit to repay or to limit its future borrowing. Through the lens of the model, the widening gap implies that investors expect to recover more on foreign-law debt. The government still borrows under domestic law because shorter debt is less exposed to dilution. The fee keeps it from issuing shorter foreign-law debt, which would recover more and be less exposed to dilution. Calibrated to Colombia, the model implies recoveries of 47 percent under foreign law and 40 percent under domestic law. Removing the fee raises welfare by 12 percent of the gain the model generates when aggregate risk and default costs are eliminated, mostly through changes in how the government borrows and defaults.