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Industrial Organization, Health, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Formulary Design and Consumer Choices in Medicare Part D
Health insurers use formulary tiering and exclusion to steer patients across competing drugs, and manufacturers pay formulary-contingent rebates to insurers. This paper studies how vertical contracting between Medicare Part D plans and manufacturers shapes patient access and rebates in the long-acting insulin market. I estimate consumer demand for Part D plans and insulins, and I construct insurer and manufacturer payoffs under alternative formularies. I solve for equilibrium formularies and rebate schedules in a multi-principal, multi-agent contracting game, and I evaluate counterfactual policies: (1) prohibiting exclusion, (2) requiring coverage of biosimilar insulin, and (3) capping patient out-of-pocket costs. These policies generate relatively small improvements in patient access and consumer surplus. However, restrictions on insurers’ formulary choices weaken their leverage in the contracting game, resulting in lower rebates. These results highlight an important tradeoff between drug access and net drug prices.