Artemii Korolkov

University of Pennsylvania · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, International, Political Economy, Public

Job market paper

Fiscal Consolidations under Political Frictions: Deleveraging through Disinvestment

A common policy recommendation for high-debt countries is to consolidate debt by cutting current spending while preserving public investment. Yet actual fiscal consolidations often do the opposite. In this paper, I study the optimal dynamics of external debt and public investment in a small open economy subject to two political frictions. Governments are present-biased, placing greater weight on current consumption than households do, and cannot commit to repaying debt or following a household-optimal investment plan. I characterize the equilibrium that maximizes household welfare, conditional on repaying inherited debt. When inherited debt is sufficiently high but sustainable, the optimal path begins with a debt-consolidation phase: the economy reduces public debt by cutting investment and allowing the capital stock to decline, while keeping current spending relatively high. Subsequently, debt and capital accumulation resume. This fiscal consolidation runs counter to conventional policy recommendations and may explain why high-debt countries often struggle to follow them. High inherited debt makes repayment less attractive to the incumbent government, so sustaining repayment requires tilting the allocation toward its preferences: higher current consumption at the expense of investment. Temporary disinvestment thus makes room for politically sustainable debt reduction, allowing capital accumulation to resume.