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Theory, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Contracting with Unknown Complementarity: Ratchets and Replacement Risk
How do a firm and a worker contract while learning how productive their relationship is? A worker's effort simultaneously generates value for the firm and reveals information about the fit between the worker and his assignment. But the prospect of future wage adjustments and replacement distorts his incentives to experiment. I study these forces in a two-period principal–agent model with moral hazard, limited commitment, and limited liability. I first establish existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and characterize the optimal spot contract: when there is a chance that effort is counterproductive, the agent may be rewarded following both sufficiently strong and sufficiently poor performance, as both are evidence of effort. After the first period, the principal decides whether to replace the agent and, conditional on retention, offers a new wage contract. A forward-looking agent therefore has an incentive to influence her belief, and because he captures limited-liability rents in each period, replacement is costly to him. This incentive decomposes into an extensive retention force and an intensive wage force, which acts as a ratchet when good news raises the bar for pay. Relative to a benchmark without belief manipulation, the retention force dominates when the parties are initially pessimistic about the fit, leading to over-experimentation, while the ratchet dominates when they are initially optimistic and effort is not too costly, leading to under-experimentation. Dynamic incentives thus raise experimentation and learning when the agent's job is at risk and lower it once it is secure.