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Environmental & Energy, Industrial Organization, Public
Job market paper
The environmental costs and consumer benefits of competitive smog check markets
Regulators often delegate enforcement to third-party firms that sell compliance services. Competitive markets for these services can improve buyers’ choices but encourage sellers to help buyers evade regulations. I quantify this tradeoff in the Texas market for passenger vehicle emissions tests, using administrative data from 2002 – 2024 to detect more than 9 million falsified tests at thousands of firms. An entry event study shows that a 52% increase in nearby competitors raises incumbent cheating by 5.5%. Cheating drivers skip repairs that would prevent $139–$276 worth of annual air pollution per car. An equilibrium model weighs these external costs of competition against its benefits to drivers, capturing bribe setting by spatially differentiated firms and consumers’ dynamic choices of repairs, cheating, and fair tests. A counterfactual monopolist eliminates cheating but closes testing locations if it faces economies of scale. Welfare falls, driven by a decline in drivers’ utility more than 100 times larger in magnitude than the social benefit of reduced pollution. Doubling firm-level cheating penalties in the status quo enforcement regime reduces cheating by 60% at much lower cost to drivers.